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Abstract
Certiers verify unobserved product characteristics for buyers and thereby alleviate infor-
mational asymmetries and facilitate trade. When sellers pay for the certication, however,
certiers can be tempted to bias their opinion to favour sellers. Indeed, accounting scan-
dals and inated credit ratings suggest sellers may prefer to select dishonest certiers. I
test this proposition by estimating the e¤ect of adverse quality signals on audit demand.
Exploiting the natural experiment of Arthur Andersens demise, I nd that auditors with
worse quality signals experience a fall in demand. This suggests that reputation e¤ects
are at work even in the presence of conicts of interest.
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1 Introduction
Asymmetric information between seller and buyer can impede mutually benecial transactions.
One of the solutions to this problem is to recruit an independent third party - a certier -
who veries unobserved product characteristics for the buyer. The certiers independence is
at the heart of the tripartite arrangement. This independence, however, can be compromised
when sellers pay for the certication. For instance, in the market of auditors and credit rating
agencies (CRA) it is not the investor (i.e. the buyer of the security) who pays for the certiers
services, but the company which is to be impartially rated or audited. In this business model,
companies can naturally manipulate their ratings/audits. Furthermore, investors only have a
limited power to weed out dishonest certiers simply because companies, instead of investors,
choose auditors and CRA. Ultimately, these problems can pervert the certiers mission to serve
the investing community (Dranove and Jin 2010).
Not surprisingly, this conict of interest has often been cited as a cause for accounting scan-
dals and, more recently, for inated credit ratings (e.g. Economist 2004, 2006, BIS-CFGS 2008).
Auditors and CRA alike refute the criticism of their business model, arguing that the threat of
losing their reputation is a su¢ cient disciplinary device (e.g. Economist 2005).1 However, this
claim has not yet been empirically substantiated.
A successful mechanism of reputation has three components in the presence of conicts of
interest. Consider the audit market.2 First, investors have to punish companies which chose
low quality auditors. There is evidence that capital markets severely penalise companies whose
audit reports are of dubious quality (e.g. Chaney and Philipich 2002, GAO 2003a, Pacini and
Hillison 2003, Krishnamurthy et al 2006). Second, this negative capital market reaction should
feed into companiesauditor choice, i.e. companies should choose high quality auditors. Third,
auditors then should have the incentive to provide high quality audits. The second stage of
1An alternative business model where investors would pay for audits and ratings is di¢ cult to implement in
practice because free-riding among investors would naturally arise due to easy dissemination of audit reports
and ratings.
2Mathis et al (2009), for instance, show how reputation can fail to discipline the CRA. There are plenty of
anecdotes of rating shoppingin the CRA market, but the empirical evidence is scarce and mostly circumstantial
(see e.g. Cantor and Packer 1997, Bongaerts et al 2012, Stanton and Wallace 2010).
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this mechanism has not been empirically validated yet. In particular, it has not been analysed
whether the adverse capital market reaction to low audit quality feeds into companiesauditor
choice and if it does, how. A positive e¤ect of adverse quality signals on audit demand means
that rms prefer to engage lenient auditors in order to receive favourable reports, suggesting that
conicts of interest overwhelm reputation concerns and clearly fail the disciplinary mechanism.
A negative e¤ect, on the other hand, indicates that while investors do not pay for audit services,
they can exert discipline on auditors indirectly by forcing public companies to choose high quality
auditors a success of reputation.
In this paper, I exploit the natural experiment of Arthur Andersens collapse and test the
e¤ects of audit quality signals on companies auditor choice in discrete choice models. The
quality signals in this study are auditorsindustry specic nancial restatement histories, i.e.
the proportion of clients in an industry which restated nancial statements in the past. I nd
that auditorsrestatement histories are a crucial driving force in the subsequent auditor choice
of deserting Andersen clients.
There are compelling reasons why auditorsnancial restatement histories should forcibly
feed into a companys auditor choice. Restatements are material corrections of published nan-
cial statements which cannot be relied upon anymore and have to be reissued. Since the very
role of the independent auditor is to ensure that nancial statements are fairly presented in all
material respects, it appears natural to think that the auditor has not done its job properly
if a nancial statement has to be restated later. Indeed, there is ample evidence that capital
markets receive restatements badly. Before Andersens collapse, restatements hit the restating
company hard: on average, they triggered a 10% fall in the companys market value between
1997 - 2002 (GAO 2003a). Therefore, companies should care about auditorsrestatement pro-
les if only because capital markets do. Furthermore, the Security and Exchange Commission
(SEC) considers every restatement to be outright audit failure (GAO 2003a).3
The demise of Arthur Andersen provides a particularly well suited laboratory to test the
3On the other hand, it is not quite clear to what extent the auditor is responsible for a restatement and as a
consequence in the academic literature nancial restatements are often thought to be noisy indicators of audit
quality, if they are indicators at all (Francis 2004).
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importance of quality signals in consumer choice for a number of reasons. First, in empirical
analyses of the e¤ects of accreditation, endogenous sample selection is a fundamental problem
because the choice of accreditation is most often endogenous (Dranove and Jin 2010). Similarly,
circumstances which trigger auditor switch most probably also a¤ect the choice of the succeeding
auditor. By focusing on a forced auditor change, however, this sample selection problem is not
an issue in the current empirical investigation. Second, customers in this market are rms rather
than individuals, therefore it is more likely that we should nd a strong notion of rationality
at work. Third, Andersen was one of the big 5 auditors. Therefore, simply choosing one of
the remaining big 4 auditors could have appeared insu¢ cient to signal integrity to investors.
Perhaps not surprisingly there were widespread rumours at the time that Arthur Andersen would
not be the only one, but merely the rst one to fail (Economist, 2003a,b). It seems reasonable
then to expect that former Andersen clients paid distinct attention to quality indicators that
could potentially di¤erentiate within the exclusive group of big 4 auditors.4
The paper is organized as follows. I review the related literature in Section 2. I describe
the estimation procedure in Section 3 and the data in in Section 4. In Section 5, the estimation
results are presented. Section 6 discusses robustness and I conclude in Section 7.
2 Related literature
Conict of interest is a potentially serious problem. For instance, Hubbard (1998) found that
privately owned emission inspection facilities in California are markedly more lenient in their
passing behaviour than state facilities because, as Hubbard (2002) showed, customers were more
likely to return to inspection stations that have previously passed them. Price et al (2012) argue
that NBA referees favour home teams, teams losing during games, and teams losing in playo¤
4The determinants of audit quality (proxied by litigation, SEC enforcement actions, restatements, earnings
quality, going-concern/client failure, etc) have been investigated at the client level (e.g. independence of board
of directors, tenure of engagement, engagement hours worked), the accounting rm level (rm size, o¢ ce size,
industry experience, etc), the market level (competition, market concentration), and at the level of institutional
and legal environment (e.g. legal protection of investors, auditorslegal liability, litigation costs). See Francis
(2004, 2011) for comprehensive surveys. This literature, however, has not yet analysed how audit quality a¤ects
clientschoice of auditor.
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series in order to increase consumer demand. Poitras and Sutter (2002) shows that mandatory
safety inspection of cars fails to reduce accidents because of policy impotence. Their econometric
analysis suggests that evasion of inspection requirements is the likely cause of ine¤ective policy
as both drivers and garages can mutually benet from conducting pro forma inspections. Lastly,
teachers and students alike have an incentive to inate test scores, especially when short term
gains from gaming the rules are higher and the probability of detection is lower (see Jacob and
Levitt 2003 and the references therein).
Quality disclosure often fails to a¤ect demand if ratings are di¢ cult to understand (see
Dranove and Jin 2010). Indeed, while the disciplinary force of consumer choice is well established
when unobserved quality becomes observable due to some information disclosure (e.g. Foreman
and Shea 1999, Mathios 2000, Jin and Leslie 2003, Freedman et al 2012), previous literature
often does not nd empirical support for imperfect quality signals a¤ecting consumer choice (e.g.
Borenstein and Zimmerman 1988, Hodgkin 1996, Mocan 2007, Brown et al 2012).5 This suggests
customers have a di¢ culty (or nd it too costly) to decipher these signals. However, empirical
studies on the e¤ects of quality signals on demand have only analysed markets where customers
are individuals. The question naturally arises then whether the mechanism of reputation based
on imperfect signals works better when customers are rms. In the audit market, audit quality
is never directly observed and companies need to rely on imperfect quality signals when choosing
among auditors.
The literature on auditor change is vast (see e.g. Francis and Wilson 1988; Landsman et
al 2009; Guedhami et al 2009 and the references therein). Most of these articles, however,
focus on the selection between big N and non-big N auditors and estimate choice as a function
of client attributes. I analyse auditor choice within the group of big N auditors too and also
control for auditor characteristics.6 There are several studies in addition analysing the forced
auditor change of Andersen clients. For instance, Barton (2005) and Chen and Zhou (2007)
5There is a large literature on advertising as a signal of unobserved quality. However, empirical studies do
not o¤er strong support for the hypothesis of a systematic positive relationship between advertising and product
quality(Bagwell 2007, pp. 1784)
6The big 4 auditors are PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Ernst&Young (EY), Deloitte&Touche (DT) and
KPMG. These four auditors and Arthur Andersen constituted the big 5 before 31 August 2002.
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examine the timing of client defections. Blouin et al (2007) and Kohlbeck et al (2008) analyse
the relationship between client migration and the big 4 auditorsstrategies of Andersen o¢ ce
purchases. However, none of these studies investigate how signals of audit quality a¤ected
companiesauditor choice. I control for auditor (as well as client) attributes and thereby can
test for reputation e¤ects in auditor choice.
3 Econometric model and estimation
In discrete choice models, I investigate how former Andersen clients choose their new public
accountant. In particular, I model auditor choice as a function of auditor and client character-
istics and test whether the signal of audit quality played a signicant role in companiesauditor
choice. The quality indicator in this study is the auditors nancial restatement history, i.e. the
proportion of clients who restated nancial statements in an industry in the past.7 In the choice
models, I will have ve choices: one for each big 4 auditor (PWC, EY, Deloitte, KPMG), and
one for all the non-big 4 auditors together (NonBig). Unfortunately, I cannot further rene the
choice set due to the small number (13%) of companies which chose non-big 4 auditors.
3.1 Econometric framework
I estimate multinomial and nested logit models with auditor and client characteristics.8 In the
multinomial models, company i by choosing auditor j gets utility Uij = Wij + "ij, where Wij is
observable up to some parameters and "ij is unobserved by the econometrician. Then, company
7Financial restatements are, of course, not the only indicators. For instance, auditorslitigation history could
also be a straightforward and natural measure. However, the lack of data on litigation constrains the current
analysis to nancial restatements.
8Multinomial logit with alternative characteristics, i.e. the model where choice is a function of both alternative
and individual characteristics, is also known as conditional logit with individual characteristics or simply mixed
logit (not to be confused with the random coe¢ cient logit).
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i chooses auditor j with probability
Pij = Pr(Wij + "ij > Wil + "il) for 8l 6= j
=
eWijP
j e
Wij
(1)
where the second equality follows from the assumption that "ij is independently and identi-
cally distributed type I extreme value (Gumbel) (Train 2002). The multinomial model is based
on the assumption that the error terms are identically and independently distributed (IID).9 A
logit model which allows correlation within a subset of choices (nest) relaxes the IID assump-
tion to some extent. Therefore, in order to allow for more general substitution patterns, I also
estimate nested logits.
In the nested logit specications, both the observable and unobservable components of the
utility can be broken down into two parts: Uij = Wij + "ij = (ViB + VijjB) + (viB + vijjB), where
ViB depends only on variables that describe nest B and VijjB on the variables that describe
alternative j in nest B, viB is the unobserved (stochastic) variation across the nests and vijjB is
the random variation within the nest. Note that the presence of viB induces correlation across
the errors within the nest relaxing the assumption of IID errors.10 However, across the nests
errors are assumed to be independent. Then the choice probabilities in a standard nested logit
can be expressed as
Pij = PiB  PijjB
=
e
ViB+
1
B
IiBP
B e
ViB+
1
B
IiB
 e
BVijjBP
B e
BVijjB
where (2)
IiB = ln
X
j2B
eBVijjB
9This assumption has a behavioural association with the well known property of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA). The IID (IIA) assumption in most applications is too strong since there might be factors
a¤ecting the choice that are not specied in the model and hence can induce correlation in the error terms if
these unobserved characteristics share some common components across observations.
10viB has a special distribution such that when vijjB is extreme value distributed so is the total stochastic
component "ij = viB + vijjB . See e.g. Berry (1994) or Cardell (1997) for more details.
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where PijjB is the conditional probability of choosing alternative i given that an alternative
in nest B is chosen, and PiB is the marginal probability of choosing an alternative in nest B.
The parameter B is a measure of the degree of independence in unobserved utility among the
alternatives in nest B. IiB is the Inclusive Value or Logsum, the expected utility of choosing
an alternative in nest B.11 The nested logit model is estimated with two nests, one for big 4
(Big) and one for non-big 4 auditors (NonBig).12 The NonBig nest contains only one alternative
(i.e. all the non-big 4 auditors is a single alternative), hence it is degenerate. Note that I am
unable to further rene the choice set given the small number of companies which chose non-big
4 auditors. The nested logit model is estimated sequentially.13 It is often not obvious which
variables should enter the lower and which ones the upper level of the nest structure. The way
I proceed is as follows. First, I estimate a model with all client characteristics entering at the
lower level and having a big 4 accountant as a base category. In this way, I can identify variables
which have potential variation across nests but not within the Big nest. I add these variables
to the upper level step-wise and hence identify the nest-specic variables.
In order to estimate the auditor choice models, rst I need to estimate audit fees. I have
data only on the audit fee that a company paid to its newly engaged auditor, but I dont observe
the audit fees that the company would have paid to other auditors. Therefore, audit fees must
be estimated rst. To address the possible endogeneity of prices (e.g. simultaneity bias), I
instrument audit fees by a dummy (DEC) which switches on if the companys nancial year
ends in December (see next section). The estimation of audit fees proceeds as follows. First
I regress audit fees on di¤erent client characteristics including the instrument over the whole
11In other words, it is a weighted average of the utilities associated with the alternatives within the nest, where
the weights are probabilities of choosing each alternative.
12In many empirical analyses, the nests are not obvious a priori and, therefore, an elaborate range of experi-
ments is often necessary to identify the nest structure that best describes the data (Koppelman and Bhat 2006).
However, in the current context the industry conguration of big 4 versus non-big 4 auditors clearly lends itself
to a natural partition of the choice set. Therefore, I do not dwell on exploring di¤erent nesting structures.
13PiB and PijjB correspond to two logit models, one for the upper ("choice between nests") and one for the
lower level ("choice within nest"). The two logit models can be estimated separately (Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood, LIML) or jointly (Full Information Maximum Likelihood, FIML). Although FIML is
more e¢ cient, the numerical maximisation is much more complicated due to the fact that the joint maximum
likelihood function is not globally concave. Since I bootstrap the results, the FIML is computationally expensive
and hence the nested logit models are estimated sequentially.
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sample and identify the model that best describes the relationship. Then this model is estimated
separately on the ve subsamples, which correspond to the ve alternatives of the choice set.
That is, one regression is run on the sample of companies which chose PWC, then another one on
EY clients, etc. These ve estimated equations are the pricing equations. Calculating the tted
values of these pricing equations for every company in the whole sample, I generate ve audit
fees (one for each alternative) for each company.14 These audit fees along with other variables
enter the second stage choice models as a regressor, which results in consistent estimates (Pagan
1986, Wooldridge 2010).
Since I have generated regressors and I also correct for the endogeneity of audit fees, the
standard errors are, of course, incorrect in the second stage. Therefore, I use nonparametric
bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications in all choice models where audit fees enter
as a regressor. The bootstrap procedure applied is as follows. In each simulation, I take a
bootstrap sample from each client set that chose a particular auditor and using these samples I
estimate the audit fee regressions for each auditor (pricing equations). Using these regressions,
I generate audit fees for all clients in the whole sample. Then I take a bootstrap sample from
the whole sample and run the choice model. This procedure is repeated 1000 times. Since audit
fees get regenerated in each simulation step, the rst stage variation feeds into the second stage
resulting in asymptotically correct standard errors.
3.2 Identication
In all choice models in this study, identication relies on an exclusion restriction which takes
the form of an instrument a¤ecting audit fees but not auditor choice. The instrument DEC
dummy takes the value one if the companys nancial year ends in December and zero otherwise.
Financial year end a¤ects audit fees because of the auditors uneven workload during the year.
In particular, for about two-third of companies (both in my sample and in the population) the
14In addition to client characteristics, auditor and auditor specic industry e¤ects are also controlled for
when generating audit fees as the estimates of the intercepts and industry dummies vary across the ve pricing
equations. Note also that running separate regressions on the ve subsamples ensures that the contribution of
the instrument to the predicted fee di¤ers across the ve choices.
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nancial year ends in December putting auditors under strong pressure in the period of January
- March, while other months of the year are less busy. Therefore, if a company requires audit
out of rush months, it gets a discount.
However, the end of nancial year is clearly exogenous to the choice.15 In other words, when
exactly during the year the company requires an audit does not a¤ect directly which auditor
the company chooses; there is only an indirect e¤ect through audit fees. It is hard to imagine
a direct causal relationship between choice and the end of the companys nancial year, which
would render the instrument invalid. In principle, in the presence of binding capacity constraint
an auditor might be unable to take on a client which would further strain its busy period,
while it could easily accommodate a company with a nancial year ending, say, in June.16 Four
observations work against this argument. First, binding capacity constraints in general apply
only in the short run. The audit technology is predominantly labour intensive and therefore
capacity can in principle be exible even in the short run. Second, most of the clients switched
from Andersen in the rst half of the year leaving enough time for auditors to adjust their
capacity for the next "audit peak" in the following year if they needed to.17 Three, while the
demand for the services of the remaining auditors increased considerably due to Andersens
failure, the supply of auditors also rose due to sta¤ leaving the collapsing audit rm. These
three arguments suggest that factor (labour) demand was not completely inelastic: a (possibly
unusually high) wage existed at which accounting talent can be hired and, therefore, so did a
(possibly unusually high) audit fee at which a client can be accepted regardless of her nancial
15Most new businesses can choose their nancial year end (unless the business is taxed as a sole proprietorship).
However, once the corporations rst tax returns have been submitted to Internal Revenue Services (IRS), it is
quite di¢ cult to change the end of the nancial year: any change requires the prior agreement of the IRS and
an important business reason is usually needed for approval. Furthermore, states often have further rules that
the company has to comply with (e.g. in Colorado scal year end can be changed only once in every ten years).
The choice of nancial year can depend on many factors, of which the most important are as follows: when the
company is incorporated, the companys business cycle, whether the company is a subsidiary, and the applicable
tax environment.
16Note that this argument would also defeat the whole modelling concept since it is assumed that companies
choose auditors and not vica versa.
17One may object saying trying to re-establish the integrity of their nancials, some companies required an
immediate audit on previous yearsnancial statements. Note that, however, since most of the auditor changes
took place in the rst half of the year, an immediate audit meant for the auditor "work out of rush months"
implying unlikely capacity problems.
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year end. That is, there was an audit fee at which any auditor would have been willing and
able to expand capacity implying that the end of nancial year a¤ects choice only through
audit fees. Lastly, note that indeed each big 4 auditor and also non-big 4 auditors engaged
Andersen clients of both types (i.e. companies with nancial year ending in December and in
other months) which again suggests against the idea of binding capacity constraints. Therefore,
I regard my instrument as strongly exogenous.18
4 Data
Data on audit fees and information on the new auditors of former Andersen clients come from
AuditAnalytics, while company balance sheet and income statement items are collected from
both Compustat and AuditAnalytics. The sample consists of a cross section of 978 US public
companies which switched from Arthur Andersen between October 1, 2001 and August 31,
2002.19
Auditor characteristics are controlled for along three dimensions: the auditors restatement
history (quality signal), industry experience and audit fees. The audit quality signal is the audi-
tors restatement history (REST), which is measured by the proportion of clients which restated
nancial statements in the previous two years in a given industry.20 Financial restatements are
material corrections of published nancial statements which cannot be relied upon anymore and
have to be reissued. The data contain all restatements as AuditAnalytics didnt record most
restatement features.21 An auditors industry experience (INDEXP) is measured by the total
18I allow the impact of the instrument to vary with another variable by interacting DEC dummy with Assets.
The joint F statistic of the DEC dummy and the interaction term in the regressions that I eventually use to
generate audit fees marginally passes 10, the commonly used cut o¤ value of weak instruments.
19I take October 1, 2001 as the start date of the accounting (Enron) scandal, in line with the study of the US
Government Accountability O¢ ce (GAO) (GAO 2003b). Arthur Andersen surrendered its licenses on August
31, 2002.
20Supposedly, clients pay less attention to the overall restatement history of the auditor, they are more
concerned about auditor performance in their own industry. This seems an innocuous and intuitive assumption.
There was no statistics published on restatements prior to Andersens demise. However, individual restatements
were announced in the media, so a company which follows industry news closely can form an opinion of the
industry specic restatement proles of auditors. Note that AuditAnalytics data didnt allow me to calculate
longer restatement history than two years.
21GAO has an alternative database on restatements (GAO 2003a). However, this database didnt allow
me to identify the industries of restating companies, hence REST could only vary with auditor in this case.
11
market share (assets) of companies that an auditor audited in a given industry. Thus REST
and INDEXP vary with auditor and industry.22 As mentioned before, audit fees (FEES) are
estimated as a function of client characteristics. FEES varies with auditor and client.
In addition, I control for a wide range of client characteristics through four dimensions:
size, complexity, protability and risk. These measures are based on balance sheet and income
statement data and come from both AuditAnalytics and Compustat. For the summary statistics
of client and auditor characteristics, see Table 1 and 2.
(Table 1 and 2 about here)
5 Results
First, I discuss the results of the rst stage estimations, the audit fee regressions. Next, I
present multinomial and nested logit estimations where choice is a function of both auditor and
client characteristics. In the choice models, where the models are run on the whole sample, the
ve alternatives are PWC, EY, Deloitte, KPMG and NonBig, the latter being non-big 4 public
accountants as a fth single alternative.23 In the nested logit framework I explicitly make the
distinction between the two groups of big 4 and non-big 4 auditors.
Consequently, it would be perfectly correlated with auditor xed e¤ects in multinomial and nested logit models.
In conditional logit settings the GAO and the AuditAnalytics data yielded qualitatively same results (see Toth
2011).
22I estimated conditional logits, where I could compare estimates when REST and INDEXP variables vary
only with auditor, with auditor and industry, and with auditor, industry and time. Furthermore, in models
when REST and INDEXP vary only with auditor, I could compare the robustness of my ndings with respect
to alternative datasets as well as di¤erent horizons of restatement histories, i.e. when REST and INDEXP are
calculated based on two years restatement history (AuditAnalytics) and when they are calculated based on 5
years history (GAO database) prior to Andersen demise. The qualitative results are identical across all these
models (See Toth 2011).
23Note that in the current study the set of non-big 4 auditors consists of only a handful of auditors, those
that former Andersen clients ended up choosing. Therefore, throughout the study I will refrain from drawing
far reaching conclusions regarding the choice between the sets of big and non-big 4 auditors.
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5.1 Audit fee regressions
In the rst stage, I estimate models of the following general form:
log(FEES i) = +01 log(Sizei)+2Complexity i+
0
3Protability i+
0
4Risk i+ 
0Instrument i+ "i
The audit fee regressions for all (big 4 and non-big 4) clients can be found in Table 3; the
regressions for big 4 clients only are in Table 4. In both tables client characteristics robustly
predict auditor fees. In the nal models, 74% of the variation in audit fees is explained, a
standard gure in the audit fee literature. All the variables have the right signs and most of
them are signicant at the 1% level consistently across all models. Perhaps surprisingly, both the
signicance and the magnitude of the parameters appear very similar in the two tables. Model
(6) in Table 3 is estimated separately on the ve subsamples of clients corresponding to the ve
alternatives (not reported) and using these pricing equations ve audit fees are generated for
each company. The summary result of these estimations can be found in the summary statistics
in Table 1 under the heading of Auditor Characteristics.
(Table 3 and 4 about here)
5.2 Multinomial and nested logit models
In this section, I estimate multinomial models (1), where
Wij = j + 1REST ij + 2INDEXP ij + 3log(FEES ij)
+ 01;jSizei + 2;jComplexity i + 
0
3;jProtability i + 
0
4;jRisk i
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and log(FEES ij) is a generated regressor from the rst stage estimations.24 I also estimate
nested logit specications (2), where
ViB = 1Assets i + 2Leveragei + 'IViBig + IViNonBig
VijjB = j + 1;BREST ij + 2;BINDEXP ij + 3;Blog(FEES ij)
+ 01;jSizei + 2;jComplexity i + 
0
3;jRisk i + 
0
4;jProtability i
Note that since the NonBig nest is degenerate, the coe¢ cient of IViNonBig is one and its
not identied (See e.g. Heiss 2002). As discussed earlier, the nested logit model is estimated
sequentially. Assets and Leverage are nest specic variables and identied in a step-wise proce-
dure (see Section 3). Importantly, all multinomial and nested models are estimated with auditor
specic intercepts j, which act as auditor xed e¤ects in this setting.25
See Table 5 for the results. (Client characteristics are not reported; in general, their coe¢ -
cient estimates are statistically insignicant. See Toth 2011) The main variable of interest REST
is robustly and strongly signicant across di¤erent specications and samples. The negative sign
of REST means that if an auditors clients restated nancial statements more frequently in the
past, then it is less likely that a new client will choose the auditor. Furthermore, auditors
industry experience positively and signicantly a¤ects choice (as expected) in most models in
24Audit fees enter in the discrete choice models logged because audit fees are also logged in the rst stage. (See
Wooldridge 2010, Chapter 15.7.2) However, the models have also been estimated when audit fees are unlogged
in both the rst and second stages and also when audit fees are logged in the rst and unlogged in the second
stage; the main results are completely invariant to this specication issue.
25Several studies investigated how big 4 auditors strategy of purchasing Andersen o¢ ces a¤ected clients
auditor choice. Blouin et al (2007) argues clients with smaller agency and bigger switching costs were more
likely to migrate with their previous audit team. However, Blouin et al do not distinguish clients which switched
before and after an o¢ ce was purchased; therefore, it is unable to shed light on whether clients followed their
former (Andersen) audit team or in fact the audit team followed its clients. Indeed, Kohlbeck et al (2008) nd
that in their sample the auditor switch decision of 63% of clients was clearly not a¤ected by auditorso¢ ce
purchase because either clients (42%) switched earlier than the o¢ ce was purchased or clients (21%) belonged
to o¢ ces that were never purchased. Furthermore, Kohlbeck et al (2008) also analysed the determinants of
the probability of o¢ ce purchase: they do nd evidence that auditors purchased o¢ ces to hire Andersen sta¤
in order to ease sta¢ ng shortages brought about by Andersen clients which had already switched to them by
then. See also Ramnath and Weber (2008). Nevertheless, I control for the potentially di¤erent o¢ ce purchase
strategies of auditors (e.g. PWC didnt buy any Andersen o¢ ces) and other unobserved factors through auditor
xed e¤ects in the choice models.
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Table 5. The audit fee variable is signicant in the nested logit model (8) and it has the ex-
pected negative sign across all models. Interestingly, model (7) in Table 5 means that there are
signicant di¤erences in perceived quality within the exclusive group of big 4 auditors. This
nding suggests that the usual quality classication in the audit literature (big 4 high, non-big
4 low, see e.g. Francis 2004) can be overly simplistic. An interesting nding is that the e¤ect
of REST and INDEXP do not di¤er across the big 4 and non-big 4 dimensions in any of the
models of Table 5.
(Table 5 about here)
Next, I investigate whether the sensitivity of audit demand to perceived quality varies with
clientssize, risk or protability in a multinomial setting. With the aid of interaction terms,
I break down the e¤ect of the variables into a client-invariant and client-varying components.
The main message from Table 6 is that restatements are evaluated very similarly across clients:
none of the restatement interaction terms is signicant at conventional levels.26
(Table 6 about here)
6 Robustness
The results suggest that nancial restatement history is a key driving force of auditor choice.
However, some caveats are in order.
There is no within industry variation in REST and INDEXP which renders it impossible
to control for unobserved industry e¤ects in the choice models. In principle, there should be
some time variation in restatement histories due to the fact that Andersen clients dismissed
their former auditor at di¤erent points of times. However, this variation proved insu¢ cient for
26Before bootstrapping some of the interaction terms between REST and size measures (Assets and Market
Value) were weakly signicant (10%). One may want to blame the ine¢ cient estimation procedure for the lack
of client-varying e¤ects.
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identication since the vast majority of companies dismissed Andersen between March and June
2002. In other words, the information in the data have been fully exhausted.
While it is very reasonable to assume that unobserved industry e¤ects play a role in the
audit fee regressions (hence the inclusion of industry dummies), it is more di¢ cult to argue that
there are industry e¤ects in auditor choice that INDEXP and REST variables do not already
account for. Nevertheless, one way to account for unobserved industry e¤ects is to recreate
REST and INDEXP using a ner industry classication than the industry dummies. Therefore,
I recalculate REST and INDEXP (by splitting, for instance, Trade into Retail and Wholesales
Trade) and rerun equations (1) and (2) of Table 5 adding the full set of (coarser) industry
dummies. The results are equations (3) and (4) in Table 5. Although controlling for unobserved
industry e¤ects causes the signicance of the variable of interest, REST, to fade slightly, the
point estimates are strikingly similar and robustly signicant at the ve percent level. This
reinforces the argument that unobserved industry e¤ects do not confound the results.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I tested whether the mechanism of reputation was operational in the audit industry
following a market debacle and I nd that it was. Market crises, therefore, do not necessarily
indicate lack of discipline. In fact the analysis suggests that reputation can work even when
it is based on noisy quality signals and when the mechanism is tainted by conicts of interest.
The ndings have important lessons for not only the audit industry but for the market of credit
ratings too. The CRA industry played an instrumental role in the recent nancial crisis and the
conict of interest created by the issuer-pays business model has been the prime suspect for its
alleged malfunction. Therefore, testing reputation e¤ects in the audit industry, which applies
the exact same business model and hence su¤ers from similar conicts of interest, should be an
informative exercise for the market of credit ratings.
The current study also informs the debate on regulatory policy after market crises. On the
one hand, market crises can signal a broken mechanism of reputation: as the popular argument
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goes, market debacles lay bare the markets inability to prevent corporate malpractice. Indeed,
Andersens collapse and the alleged market failure swiftly led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002)
and the establishment of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, an auditor watchdog,
which were primarily intended to rectify a broken audit market (Economist 2007). On the other
hand, market crises can be the very result of reputation at work. Furthermore, they can also lead
to an e¤ective disciplinary mechanism where there was none before if markets learn. Therefore,
regulation, although popular, may not be the most adequate response to crises if reputation has
the potential to discipline. Instead, enhancing this market mechanism can be more promising:
e.g. Jin and Leslie (2003) shows that information disclosure can dramatically improve the
workings of reputation. Therefore, public collection and disclosure of data on underlying audit
and rating quality could go a long way to improving discipline in these markets.
The result that signals of audit quality is a major driving force of companiesauditor choice
may not generalise straightforwardly. This study focuses on a somewhat unique time, at the
height of accounting scandals and when a major accounting rm was collapsing. This is a time
when public companies were particularly concerned with their auditors accuracy. Therefore,
audit quality signals may be less important drivers of auditor choice in normal times. However,
there are good reasons to think that Andersens failure increased the disciplinary e¤ect of
reputation in the audit industry. Due to data limitations, this study cannot directly test how
important a role the quality signal played before the market crisis. By investigating consumer
choice pre- and post crises, future research could explore in-depth the process through which
markets learn.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: auditor characteristics
REST INDEXP Arthur Andersen Clients
Fees, Act. Fees, Est. Asset (Bn) N
PWC 0.055 0.285 751065 580513 2544 119
EY 0.041 0.195 783873 556035 1481 211
Deloitte 0.031 0.177 850840 507440 2665 180
KPMG 0.034 0.160 798614 645523 1488 182
NonBig 0.005 0.005 127995 260171 62 74
Notes: Third column: average audit fee paid by former Andersen clients to their new auditor. Fourth: estimated average fee that
an auditor would have received had it engaged all former Andersen clients. Fifth and sixth: average asset and number of former
Andersen clients, respectively.
Table 2: Summary Statistics: client characteristics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Assets (Bn) 978 3259 22535 0 641100
Revenue (Bn) 978 1622 4761 0 47948
Market Value (Bn) 978 1901 8361 0 154112
Inventory (Mn) 942 136 495 0 6286
Business Segments (No of) 849 2.19 1.53 1 9
Loss 978 0.38 0.49 0 1
ROA 956 -0.10 0.52 -5.60 4.06
Current Assets/Total Assets 828 0.47 0.26 0.01 1
Inventory/Revenue 934 0.11 0.29 0 5.65
Quick Ratio 816 2.32 3.97 0.03 66
Goingconcern 978 0.05 0.22 0 1
Leverage 956 0.57 0.33 0.01 3.57
DEC 978 0.72 0.45 0 1
Industry dummies (NAICS code):
Agriculture 978 0.00 0.05 0 1
Natural Resources 978 0.06 0.24 0 1
Utilities 978 0.05 0.21 0 1
Manufacturing/Construction 978 0.36 0.48 0 1
Trade (Retail, Wholesales) 978 0.07 0.26 0 1
Services 978 0.21 0.41 0 1
Information Technology 978 0.10 0.30 0 1
Financial Sector 978 0.14 0.35 0 1
Notes: Loss: 1 if the company produced loss previous year. Goingconcern: 1 if the company received a going concernaudit opinion
previous year. DEC: 1 if the companys nancial year ends in December.
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Table 3: Audit Fee Regressions, all clients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Assets) 0.230*** 0.207*** 0.253*** 0.328*** 0.329*** 0.256***
(8.25) (7.57) (7.48) (8.49) (8.55) (5.88)
log(Revenue) 0.157*** 0.201*** 0.166*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.104***
(6.70) (8.57) (6.68) (3.59) (3.43) (3.51)
log(Market Value) 0.043** 0.060*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.063*** 0.068***
(2.57) (3.62) (2.85) (2.94) (3.52) (3.82)
log(Inventory) 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.054*** 0.047** 0.052***
(3.73) (3.59) (3.74) (2.66) (2.31) (2.59)
Business Segments 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082***
(5.26) (5.22) (5.28) (5.12) (5.15) (5.18)
DEC 0.123** 0.106** 0.118** 0.123** 0.119** -0.350**
(2.33) (2.08) (2.31) (2.43) (2.37) (-2.45)
Loss 0.225*** 0.171*** 0.165*** 0.153*** 0.156***
(4.33) (3.17) (3.07) (2.86) (2.93)
ROA -0.195*** -0.188*** -0.161*** -0.127*** -0.137***
(-4.40) (-4.29) (-3.64) (-2.82) (-3.05)
Current Assets/Total Assets 0.260** 0.525*** 0.557*** 0.557***
(2.29) (4.08) (4.34) (4.37)
Inventory/Revenue 0.173 0.251 0.222
(0.92) (1.33) (1.18)
Quick Ratio -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.036***
(-4.83) (-3.98) (-4.01)
Goingconcern 0.163 0.150
(1.45) (1.35)
Leverage 0.196** 0.166**
(2.32) (1.98)
log(Assets)  DEC 0.089***
(3.50)
Constant -4.044*** -4.312*** -4.454*** -4.554*** -4.711*** -4.375***
(-48.07) (-47.62) (-34.47) (-34.08) (-33.15) (-25.68)
N 836 836 767 759 759 759
R2 0.704 0.723 0.731 0.736 0.739 0.743
Adjusted R2 0.700 0.719 0.727 0.731 0.734 0.738
F Statistics 196 179 158 148 131 126
Notes: Dependent variable is log(FEES). Regressions are run on the whole sample. Industry dummies included. t-statistics are in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Audit Fee regressions, big 4 auditor clients only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Assets) 0.221*** 0.196*** 0.246*** 0.332*** 0.328*** 0.237***
(7.50) (6.77) (6.67) (7.92) (7.85) (4.87)
log(Revenue) 0.159*** 0.199*** 0.167*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 0.099***
(6.42) (7.96) (6.35) (3.20) (3.05) (3.18)
log(Market Value) 0.039** 0.057*** 0.050** 0.052*** 0.063*** 0.072***
(2.11) (3.13) (2.55) (2.66) (3.16) (3.61)
log(Inventory) 0.099*** 0.092*** 0.097*** 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.075***
(4.94) (4.68) (4.56) (3.12) (2.80) (3.22)
Business Segments 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.076***
(4.89) (4.90) (4.63) (4.56) (4.56) (4.50)
DEC 0.127** 0.110** 0.114** 0.115** 0.109** -0.461***
(2.28) (2.02) (2.09) (2.15) (2.02) (-2.72)
Loss 0.219*** 0.177*** 0.173*** 0.162*** 0.170***
(4.02) (3.12) (3.06) (2.85) (3.01)
ROA -0.161*** -0.146*** -0.122** -0.097* -0.107**
(-3.25) (-2.99) (-2.47) (-1.94) (-2.15)
Current Assets/Total Assets 0.258** 0.547*** 0.570*** 0.565***
(2.10) (3.90) (4.07) (4.07)
Inventory/Revenue 0.196 0.318 0.249
(0.67) (1.08) (0.85)
Quick Ratio -0.044*** -0.038*** -0.038***
(-4.78) (-4.00) (-4.07)
Goingconcern 0.078 0.104
(0.55) (0.74)
Leverage 0.221** 0.188*
(2.19) (1.88)
log(Assets)  DEC 0.103***
(3.55)
Constant -4.074*** -4.313*** -4.480*** -4.594*** -4.732*** -4.314***
(-43.24) (-42.84) (-31.36) (-30.43) (-29.55) (-21.82)
N 753 753 693 687 687 687
R2 0.696 0.712 0.723 0.728 0.730 0.735
Adjusted R2 0.692 0.707 0.718 0.722 0.724 0.729
F Statistics 170 152 136 128 113 109
Notes: Dependent variable is log(FEES). Regressions are run on the sample of companies which chose big 4 auditors. Industry
dummies included. t-statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Multinomial and Nested Logit
ML NL
All Clients Big 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
REST -5.374*** -5.373*** -6.514** -6.424** -5.239*** -5.306*** -5.696*** -6.146***
(-3.49) (-3.52) (-1.99) (-1.98) (-2.81) (-2.83) (-3.32) (-3.79)
REST  NonBig 16.549 110.913 14.271 -1.178
(0.37) (0.30) (0.38) (-0.02)
INDEXP 1.256** 1.234** 1.395 1.417 1.241** 1.246** 1.230** 1.212**
(2.43) (2.39) (1.36) (1.38) (2.33) (2.34) (2.31) (2.32)
INDEXP  NonBig -17.918 1.195 -18.453 -66.215
(-0.26) (0.01) (-0.35) (-0.74)
log(FEES) -0.337 -0.120 -0.065 0.141 -0.834** -0.726**
(-1.12) (-0.38) (-0.20) (0.41) (-2.38) (-2.17)
log(FEES)  NonBig -1.467** -1.336* -0.846
(-2.12) (-1.82) (-1.10)
Industry Dummies No No Yes Yes No No No No
N 759 759 759 759 759 759 687 759
LogLikelihood -1064 -1059 -1029 -1024 -1064 -1064 -897 -1057
Notes: Dependent variable is auditor choice. Client characteristics included (see Table 2 for the list of variables). log(FEES)
is a generated regressor. Non-parametric bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications. z-statistics are in parentheses, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Multinomial logit: First six columns: estimated on the whole sample. Seventh column: estimated on
the subsample of companies which chose big 4 auditors. Nested Logit (last column): Nesting structure: Big (PWC, EY, Deloitte,
KPMG), NonBig (NonBig). Assets and Leverage enter the upper, all other client characteristics enter the lower level of the nest
structure. The model is estimated sequentially (LIML). The LogLikelihood value is the sum of the loglikelihoods of the upper and
lower levels.
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Table 6: Multinomial logit with auditor and client characteristics interacted, all clients
X =
Assets Revenue Market Inventory Business Loss
Value Segments
REST -2.660 -4.012** -4.015** -5.580*** -3.760 -5.518***
(-1.40) (-2.10) (-2.40) (-2.92) (-1.40) (-2.85)
REST  X -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 -0.541 2.600
(-1.56) (-0.81) (-1.20) (0.37) (-0.69) (0.60)
INDEXP 1.264** 1.204** 1.025* 0.807 0.820 1.679**
(2.12) (1.99) (1.80) (1.29) (0.89) (2.55)
INDEXP  X 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.162 -1.395
(0.01) (0.04) (0.46) (1.06) (0.54) (-1.25)
log(FEES) -0.344 -0.386 -0.418 -0.370 -0.482 -0.892**
(-1.17) (-1.30) (-1.38) (-1.24) (-1.21) (-2.44)
log(FEES)  X 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.001 0.077 1.025**
(0.17) (0.59) (1.69) (0.53) (0.52) (2.53)
N 759 759 759 759 759 759
LogLikelihood -1061 -1062 -1057 -1061 -1063 -1060
X =
ROA Current Assets/ Inventory/ Quick Ratio Goingconcern Leverage
Total Assets Revenue
REST -5.135*** -7.094** -5.342** -3.634* -5.619*** -6.544
(-2.99) (-2.42) (-2.45) (-1.70) (-3.24) (-0.95)
REST  X -5.960 9.228 -1.107 -1.536 16.346 1.778
(-0.68) (1.19) (-0.04) (-1.14) (0.74) (0.18)
INDEXP 1.383** 2.564*** 0.760 1.038 1.239** 1.578
(2.55) (2.91) (1.15) (1.47) (2.34) (1.22)
INDEXP  X 2.158 -3.670* 7.264 0.178 -0.175 -0.531
(1.46) (-1.86) (1.24) (0.57) (-0.05) (-0.28)
log(FEES) -0.389 -1.424*** -0.361 -0.465 -0.419 -0.237
(-1.27) (-2.85) (-1.12) (-1.43) (-1.34) (-0.58)
log(FEES)  X -0.172 2.263*** -0.051 0.067 0.895 -0.178
(-0.53) (2.99) (-0.03) (1.28) (1.22) (-0.35)
N 759 759 759 759 759 759
LogLikelihood -1062 -1058 -1063 -1062 -1062 -1063
Notes: Dependent variable is auditor choice. The heading of a column indicates the variable which auditor characteristics are
interacted with. Client characteristics included (see Table 2 for the list of variables). log(FEES) is a generated regressor. Non-
parametric bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications. z statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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